Dissertation
My dissertation works to reshape our understanding of the relation between deontic morality and our affective attitudes.
In “Is Moral Feeling Owed?” (Chapter One) I argue that we have a defeasible obligation to engage in a kind of practice by means of which we regularly manifest certain emotional dispositions typical of mature moral agents. In meeting this obligation we contribute to conditions in which others enjoy the moral regard they are owed. I show how several familiar arguments against the very possibility of an affective obligation misfire when applied to the view.
In “Moral Appreciation: What, Why, and How” (Chapter Two) I further develop the rationale behind the obligation introduced in Chapter One. I argue that moral feeling is a constitutive feature of "moral appreciation", a moral analogue of aesthetic appreciation. While there is no obligation to appreciate aesthetic value, there is an obligation to appreciate persons as such. I argue that this is best understood as an obligation directed to groups.
In “The Axiology of Anger” (Chapter Three) I consider the place of moral anger in the picture developed over the first two chapters. An early version of the paper appeared in Philosophy in connection with the Royal Institute of Philosophy Essay Competition. I argue that given a proper understanding of anger’s role in valuing we can explain our entitlement to moral anger with resources like those which explain our entitlement to the use of defensive force against threateners. In turn, we can explain many cases in which a person’s anger seems objectionable. These are cases in which the person’s anger fails to reflect a wider suite of dispositions which are central to valuing.
Some Projects in Progress
Moral Epistemology and Moral Learning
With a paper called “What (Good) is a Moral Epiphany?” I have begun a long-range project on experiences which contribute to moral learning. The paper draws on the cognitive science of insight in problem solving to develop a better understanding of the nature and etiology of “moral epiphanies”—both major and minor. The paper also explores the epistemic significance of these experiences: a central epistemic function of a moral epiphany, I suggest, is to enable us to set off on new courses of routine moral learning. I plan to follow this paper with a paper on the prospects and perils of employing images and other forms of evocative media for moral learning.
Epistemology and the Ethics of Belief
My research interests in the ethics of feeling stem from past work in the ethics of belief. Early in my doctoral work I published a paper in Philosophical Studies entitled “Regrettable Beliefs”. It explores an evidentialism-friendly strategy for accommodating intuitions elicited in support of the claim that moral considerations bear on the epistemic justification of belief. I argue that an attitude of regret is called for in response to maintaining certain beliefs, even if we are epistemically justified in holding them. I am currently developing a paper that pushes the basic project forward by arguing that certain morally disturbing beliefs, if justifiably believed, nevertheless fail to indicate the epistemic achievement we ought to be aiming for—namely, understanding. The beliefs at issue are held in connection with unsupported "generic" beliefs, which undermine the contribution they might otherwise make to understanding.
Prospective Intention
In a paper called “What’s in a Resolution?” I tackle a familiar puzzle that arises in connection with a device we use to turn fleeting moments of moral clarity into right conduct over time—namely, resolving to act. Could resolving to do something give one a reason to do it? I argue that it could, and plausibly does, insofar as following through on one’s resolution is itself a form of valuing the object of valuation in light of which one formed the resolution.
Moral Appreciation
Two papers at earlier stages of development return to issues connected with my dissertation. “The Objects of Moral Appreciation” addresses a problem concerning how appreciative moral experience evoked by a representative of a group, even a fictional representative, could contribute to appreciating the moral claims of the group’s members. I argue that the representative must be properly regarded, and treated, as a representative. “Appreciating Moral Reasons” applies my notion of moral appreciation toward a unified explanation of what is problematic about deferring to the moral opinions of others, and becoming affectively detached from our own moral opinions. In both cases, we fail to appreciate the contents of the moral beliefs to which we subscribe.