Dissertation
In my dissertation aim to reshape our understanding of the significance of emotional attitudes in our lives as valuers and moral agents.
In “How We Value” (Chapter One) I work toward a theoretical framework for understanding what it is for us to value things. In so doing I address an ongoing dispute among philosophers concerning which kinds of attitudes are involved in valuing. The paper is in the first instance a methodological intervention: I stress the need for us to identify a theoretical rationale for claims as to which are the attitudes of valuing. I suggest that we understand valuing as a form of “practical” engagement with objects of valuation. I argue that emotional attitudes play an essential role in this form of engagement; reflective beliefs about what is valuable, however, do not.
In “Is Respect Owed?” (Chapter Two) I argue that we have a defeasible moral obligation to engage in a kind of practice by means of which we regularly manifest certain emotional dispositions typical of mature moral agents. In meeting this obligation we contribute to conditions in which others are valued as they can expect to be. I show how several familiar philosophical arguments against the very possibility of a moral obligation of feeling misfire when applied to the view. These arguments depend for their force on a picture of the would-be obligation which we have independent reason to reject in favor of the alternative I motivate.
In “How to Be(come) Justifiably Angry” (Chapter Three) I consider the place of moral anger in the picture developed over the first two chapters. A very early version of the paper appeared in Philosophy in connection with the Royal Institute of Philosophy Essay Competition. I argue that given a proper understanding of moral anger’s role in valuing we can explain our entitlement to moral anger with resources like those which explain our entitlement to the use of defensive force against physical threateners. In turn, we can explain many cases in which a person’s anger seems objectionable. These are cases in which the person’s anger fails to reflect a wider suite of attitudes and behaviors in which valuing consists.
Some Projects in Progress
Moral Epistemology and Moral Learning
With a paper called “What (Good) is a Moral Epiphany?” I have begun a long-range project on experiences which contribute to moral learning. The paper draws on the cognitive science of insight in problem solving to develop a better understanding of the nature and etiology of “moral epiphanies”—both major and minor. The paper also explores the epistemic significance of these experiences: they serve to make certain evidence more accessible to us in both thought and action, and to set us off on new courses of routine moral learning. I plan to follow this paper with a paper on the prospects and perils of employing images and other forms of evocative media for moral learning.
Epistemology and the Ethics of Belief
My research interests in the ethics of feeling stem from past work in the ethics of belief. Early in my doctoral work I published a paper in Philosophical Studies entitled “Regrettable Beliefs”. It explores an evidentialism-friendly strategy for accommodating intuitions elicited in support of the claim that moral considerations bear on the epistemic justification of belief. I argue that an attitude of regret is called for in response to maintaining certain beliefs, even if we are epistemically justified in holding them. I am currently developing a paper that pushes the basic project forward by arguing that certain morally disturbing beliefs, if justifiably believed, nevertheless fail to indicate the epistemic achievement we ought to be aiming for—namely, understanding. The beliefs at issue are held in connection with unsupported "generic" beliefs, which undermine the contribution they might otherwise make to understanding.
Prospective Intention
In a paper called “What’s in a Resolution?” I tackle a familiar puzzle that arises in connection with a device we use to turn fleeting experiences of moral clarity into right conduct over time—namely, resolving to act. Could resolving to do something give one a reason to do it? I argue that it could, and plausibly does, insofar as following through on one’s resolution is itself a form of valuing the object of valuation in light of which one formed the resolution.
Moral Appreciation
Two papers at earlier stages of development return to issues connected with my dissertation. “The Objects of Moral Appreciation” addresses a problem concerning how appreciative moral experience evoked by a representative of a group, even a fictional representative, could contribute to appreciating the moral claims of the group’s members. I argue that the representative must be properly treated as a representative. “Appreciating Moral Reasons” applies my notion of moral appreciation toward a unified explanation of what is problematic about deferring to the moral opinions of others, and becoming too emotionally detached from our own moral opinions. In both cases, we fail to appreciate the contents of the moral beliefs to which we subscribe.